Mainstream endogenous growth models assume that new knowledge is embodied into new intermediate or final goods, monopolistically supplied by the patent holder. Recent technological progress, however, often gives rise to pure intellectual contents, such as software codes or business models, directly usable in the production of final goods. Once a content of this type has been produced, it is in fixed supply, that is, the inventor can only rent it out (or sell it) or not; hence the quantity restriction typical of monopoly cannot arise, while competition is viable (Chantrel et al., 2012; . We show that, however, as long as the inventor owning a patent can control through license activation devices the access to the intellectual content of the workers using her invention in the final goods production, monopolistic exploitation becomes viable and will occur. It turns out that in this framework both the level of wages and of consumption and the rate of growth of the economy are smaller than in the first best, while with elastic labor supply also labor employment is negatively impacted. This implies that some standard public policies devised for correcting inefficiencies in development can perform poorly in this framework.
Introduction
In the recent past one way of highlighting the pace of technical progress was to quote the Moore law, describing the expected improvements in a widely used intermediate good, the semiconductor. Nowadays, however, technical progress appears largely disembodied, and characterized by the supply of new immaterial goods such as DNA sequences, software codes, computer programs, internet applications, business models, etc., which are patentable 1 and directly usable 1 in the final goods production, without having to be incorporated into capital or intermediate inputs. This feature does not fit well into standard endogenous growth models, 2 which assume that, in a system with Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), the successful inventor has the opportunity of becoming the sole supplier of a new final or intermediate good, embodying the results of her activity. She can thus charge a monopoly price and earn a compensation for her research effort. 3 Boldrin and Levine (2008) identify the rival good in which an invention is embedded with the copies reporting it, which can be used for direct consumption or employed for (time consuming) reproduction. If the inventor is protected by a patent, she gains by restricting the supply of copies. To avoid this monopolistic exploitation Boldrin and Levine suggest to abolish the IPR protection. In this way the inventor, by selling the first copy, would have just the opportunity of recovering the present value of future copies, whose number, however, she cannot restrict. If the compensation for the first copy is large enough to cover the indivisible initial cost of producing it, research is viable and efficiency is reached.
While the desirability of allowing the financing of research through patents is debated, a patent-so goes the mainstream approach-can lead to monopolistic exploitation as long as it enables the inventor to be the sole producer of a rival good whose supply she can restrict. But if knowledge is disembodied only the invention itself can be brought to the market, and because an invention is a discrete good in fixed supply, no quantity restriction, and thus no simple monopoly exploitation, can occur. 4 This implication of disembodied knowledge has prompted the elaboration of new endogenous growth models, with competitive markets for knowledge, in which Lindahl prices are paid (Chantrel et al., 2012; . In these markets, even if inventions are protected by patents, the inventor just recovers the present value of the marginal benefits enjoyed by the users of her invention, and does not earn any monopoly profit. Moreover, under the standard assumption that patents refer to marginal addition to the stock of knowledge (which behaves as a continuous homogeneous good when used in the final goods' production), no indivisibility problem arises.
In this paper we study a case in which monopolistic exploitation is possible even if knowledge is disembodied. The basic idea is that disembodied knowledge cannot be used as the sole input in the final goods' production, because we do not leave in a world of pure spirits. It must instead be combined with other physical inputs to produce final goods, among which some will be rival; in this paper we focus on labor. In such a framework the patent holder can design a contract by which the invention can be accessed only by workers for which a personal license has been activated. That is, as long as the cost of using the necessary software and of enforcement against infringement is not too large, the inventor can set and collect a royalty conditional on the amount of labor "augmented" by the invention. 5 The firms producing final goods can accept such a contract as long as they pay in total for labor (i.e., for the wage and for the license) no more than the marginal product of labor.
We show that in this case the inventor can actually earn a monopoly rent. While this case has some features in common with the standard approach about embedded knowledge followed in the literature-i.e., in both cases a rival good is exploited-there are differences due to the fact that, in our case, the rival good also commands a specific compensation not cashed by the patent holder, namely the wage compensation for labor. We show that in this framework, under standard assumptions and considering either inelastic or elastic labor supply, economic growth occurs at a lower rate than in a first-best economy. Moreover, this way of financing research involves a kind of "taxation" of wages, thus implying a reduction of the workers' income share with respect to the first-best. 6 A further source of inefficiency is due to the fact that resources used for activating and maintaining the personal licenses represent a pure waste, as their role is to exclude those who do not pay from accessing knowledge, i.e., a pure public good whose marginal cost of use is nil.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present a simple model characterized by inelastic labor supply and discuss the decentralized static and intertemporal equilibria; moreover, we show that, as one should expect, the latter is inferior to the corresponding firstbest, social planner equilibrium. In Section 3 we consider the case in which labor is elastically supplied and show that in this scenario the decentralized equilibrium performs even more poorly, as also labor supply is being reduced. Finally, Section 4 provides some hints about the implications of the model in terms of policies and concludes.
The model with inelastic labor supply
Let us consider an infinite-horizon economy where the representative household aims at maximizing the following lifetime utility function:
where C (t) is aggregate consumption at instant t and ρ > 0 is the (constant) rate of time preference. There is no demographic growth and labor supply, L, is inelastic. The instantaneous production function of final goods, echoing those in the Romer/GrossmanHelpman/Aghion-Howitt models, 7 is
with 0 < α < 1, where Y is a composite final good with price 1 (the numeraire), X is an intermediate good composed of final goods also priced at the numeraire, A is knowledge, which, from the final good producers' (F -firms) perspective is a continuous variable representing an aggregate composition of perfect substitutes, implying that whichever new idea is added to the stock, it has the same marginal productivity of all other ideas. The market for final goods is competitive. All the F -firms take prices as given and demand intermediate goods X and labor L. As raw labor L would be unproductive if not augmented by knowledge, while it has maximal productivity when the whole knowledge stock A is used, F -firms are willing to pay for labor the wages to the workers themselves joint with the royalties to the patent holders who provide personal licenses allowing workers to access the knowledge stock A for free. As (2) is homogeneous of degree 1 in two variables (augmented labor and the intermediate good) and all the firms pay the same prices, one can consider a representative firm supplying the whole final goods' production. The instantaneous profit function Π (X, L) of the representative F -firm is:
where R is the per capita royalty for activating the licenses for the whole stock A. The FOCs are:
Personal licenses are supplied by many identical firms (R&D-firms) which produced one unit of A and own the corresponding patent. By solving (4) for RA and dividing the result by A, it turns out that the representative R&D-firm faces the following inverse demand for personal licenses:
where, according to a Nash behavior assumption, it is assumed that the representative R&D-firm takes the inverse demand as a function of the sole L, while all the other variables are taken as given. The (instantaneous) profit function of the representative R&D-firm is
where β ≥ 0 is the constant per capita cost of activating the licenses for one unit of A. Activation is costly because it entails specific software maintenance and prevention of illegal access. In order the activation cost to be compatible with positive labor supply the following assumption is needed.
A. 1
The activation cost is not too large; specifically,
The FOC for profit maximization of the representative R&D-firm turns out to be:
By solving it for the optimal quantity of personal licenses L * , one gets:
By substituting L * into (5), the royalty, as a function of the equilibrium wage w, turns out to be:
The monopoly royalty involves a mark-up over the personal license cost β and is increasing in the wage w. One can also see (8) as a reaction function of the R&D-firm to the wage arising on the market. 4 
The instantaneous market equilibrium
From (3) one gets:
which implies that the intermediate good and the augmented labor are used in fixed proportions. By substituting R (w) as in (8) and X as in (9) into (4) for the F -firm the equilibrium wage turns out to be:
which, under Assumption A.1, is strictly positive. Because labor supply is inelastic, the labor market equilibrium wage level w in (10) implies full employment; therefore, L * = L * (w) = L is the number of licenses that will actually be sold in the market equilibrium; in other words, all the given labor supply will be augmented by A.
In summary, the instantaneous market equilibrium is characterized as follows:
i) R&D-firms maximize their profit by choosing the optimal royalty R(w) in (8) as a function of the equilibrium wage w;
ii) the representative F -firm maximizes its profit taking R(w) and w as given;
iii) the labor market clears at the equilibrium wage w and, as labor supply is inelastic, this occurs at full employment.
According to (4), such characterization implies that the marginal product of labor equals the (augmented) labor marginal cost, which is given by the sum of a) the equilibrium wage w and b) the term R (w) A, where R (w) is the optimal royalty in (8); R (w) A is paid for allowing each worker to access the whole available knowledge stock.
The wage in (10) should be compared with the wage w, equal to the marginal product of labor, that would arise in a first-best economy in which the government intervenes by collecting a lump-sum tax to finance knowledge production and then releases it for free. Wage w is obtained by setting R = 0 and using (9) into (4):
Clearly, w > w, as workers under monopolistic exploitation of knowledge earn a wage smaller than in a first-best economy at any given A level. They also bear the full personal licenses' activation cost βA. By plugging (10) into (8) we get
which, when used in (6), yields the R&D-firm profit:
Hence, under the assumption of inelastic labor supply, the R&D-firm profit turns out to be constant.
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The intertemporal equilibrium
To keep our analysis simple, we assume that one unit of knowledge is produced at the constant cost δ. In order both to finance the research cost and to satisfy the free entry condition the following equality must hold:
It postulates that the present value of future (instantaneous) profits, as defined in (12), must be equal to the (constant) production cost of a unit of new knowledge incurred at instant t. By differentiating with respect to time in (13), the interest rate turns out to be constant:
Because the only asset in the economy is the knowledge stock A owned by households, from (13) it follows that the instantaneous household's asset is given by V (t) A (t) = δA (t), and, taking into account the interest rate as in (14), her problem is that of maximizing (1) under the dynamic budget constrainṫ
where π (L), w are given by (12) and (10) respectively. In order to obtain a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) type of equilibrium note that, because π (L) and w in (15) are both constants, the ratio C/A must be constant as well, so thatȦ/A =Ċ/C must hold; moreover, after replacing (9) into (2), it is clearly seen thatẎ /Y =Ȧ/A as well. Hence, using (14) in the standard Euler condition [recall that the instantaneous utility in (1) is logarithmic] we obtain the following constant rate of growth of consumption, C, knowledge, A, and output, Y , along the BGP:
The growth rate 8 g is positive whenever (1 − α) α 1 1−α L > δρ, while the transversality condition at infinity holds because, from (14) and (16), it follows that r > g; also, as (9) requires that X (0) = α 1 1−α LA (0), the economy starts immediately on the BGP, that is, there are no transitions.
The first-best, social planner equilibrium
To compare g as in (16) to the rate of growth that would arise in a first-best economy, let us consider the corresponding social planner problem. The resource constraint at instant t is
where J (t) represents the amount of output invested in R&D activity, and on the RHS the total output net of the intermediate goods is considered. Dropping time dependency for simplicity, in order to obtain a dynamic constraint in the only variables A (state) and C (control) a social planner first considers maximization of the net output Y − X = X α (AL) 1−α − X with respect to X for a given stock A at instant t: the solution turns out to be the same as in (9) 
Under our assumption of a constant cost equal to δ required to produce one unit of new knowledge, J = δȦ, so that (17) can be rewritten aṡ
Denoting by λ (t) the costate variable associated to the unique dynamic constraint (18) and dropping the time argument for simplicity, the current-value Hamiltonian of the social planner problem is
Necessary conditions are
where (21) is the transversality condition. Differentiating (19) with respect to time and coupling the result with (20), using (18) and rearranging terms we obtain the following consumption growth rate:
As 0 < α < 1 implies α α 1−α > α 1 1−α , the social planner growth rate g S is clearly larger than the decentralized one g in (16) . This result is somewhat unexpected, because a system with personal licenses, although characterized by monopolistic exploitation, involves features that should sustain efficiency, namely: i) the whole labor is used, like in the first-best; ii) the burden of monopolistic exploitation is borne in full by workers, through a reduction of their wage which settles strictly below their marginal product; iii) instantaneous efficiency in production is preserved, because the composite factor AL is paid its marginal product; iv) research is financed in a non distortionary way through a tax on labor supply, which is inelastic. The intuition for the result relies on a dynamic inefficiency arising because the profit obtained by patent holders falls short of the marginal product of knowledge. This implies a too small interest rate and thus a too small growth.
The case of elastic labor supply
To tackle the case of elastic labor supply let us normalize the labor potential supply of the households to one; that is, the actual instantaneous labor supply is now 0 ≤ L (t) ≤ 1. We focus on a case in which labor supply, while being variable, tends to a constant in the steady state, 10 in which the economy evolves along an Asymptotic Balanced Growth Path (ABGP). Let us adopt the following specification of the household utility function:
where γ ≥ 0 indicates the preference for leisure and C (t) refers to individual consumption (equal to total consumption). As from now on we focus on the steady state in which labor supply is constant, all the results pertaining to profits and prices presented in the previous sections hold, with L being now some value between 0 and 1. We need to further restrict the range of values for the activation cost in order to allow for positive labor supply in the equilibrium.
A. 2 The activation cost
The constrained maximization of utility in (23) implies the following consumption-leisure optimality condition:
while, when monopolistic exploitation occurs, the household budget constraint is the same as in (15) and can be rewritten in the more general forṁ
In the steady state the economy evolves along the ABGP at the constant rate given by the Euler equation, g =Ċ/C =Ȧ/A =Ẏ /Y = r − ρ, so that (25) can be rewritten as:
where in the last equality we used the Euler equation. Coupling (26) with (24) and using (10) one gets:
which, under Assumption A.2, yields a positive amount of labor L along the ABGP equilibrium. It turns out that the larger the license activation cost β, the smaller is labor supply. That is, β, by reducing the wage, reduces labor supply via the substitution effect. Under variable labor supply the economy is thus more deeply impacted by the personal license system than with inelastic labor supply.
As the interest rate is the same as in (14), along the ABGP the growth rate is again given by the Euler equation and is equal to g in (16), but with L given by (27) instead of the inelastically supplied value used there. To compare this growth rate to that of a first-best economy, again we consider the corresponding social planner problem. The resource constraint is the same as in (17) , and after following the same steps as in Section 2.3, one easily gets the same dynamic constraint as in (18). Hence, denoting by λ the costate variable associated to it, now the current-value Hamiltonian of the social planner problem is
plus the same transversality condition as in (21). Differentiating (28) with respect to time and coupling the result with (30), using (18) and rearranging terms once more we easily obtain the same expression for the growth rate 11 as in (22), only that now g S is determined by the optimal amount of labor L S chosen by the social planner to be employed in the producing sector, instead of the amount obtained in (27):
To find L S , by coupling (28) and (29) we first obtain the optimal consumption/knowledge ratio, which, again, must be constant along the ABGP:
and then, by replacing it into the resource constraint (18) and using (31),
we easily get
Through a quick comparison between (32) and (27) it is immediately seen that L S > L for any γ ≥ 0, which, in turn, as α α 1−α > α 1 1−α , when used in (31), implies that the social planner growth rate is again strictly larger than the decentralized one in (16):
Note that when labor supply is elastic the gap between g S and g is even larger than that with inelastic labor supply: in (33), besides the terms α α 1−α > α 1 1−α already making the difference in Section 2, according to (32) and (27) the equilibrium labor amounts L S > L further add to such a difference. In fact when labor supply is elastic not only the intertemporal allocation of resources is distorted, but also the instantaneous efficiency of the economy is negatively affected, since workers react to the drop of wages by restricting their labor supply. 11 The same argument as in footnote 9 establishes that the transversality condition (21) holds.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we considered an economy in which knowledge is dematerialized, patented, and directly usable in the final goods' production. The patent holders are able to earn monopoly profits because they provide on an exclusive basis personal licenses to the workers involved in final goods' production, as a condition for letting them access knowledge contents. Contracts providing the activation of personal licenses for agents operating within firms are actually used in the fields of software, data banks, access to on-line commercial and financial platforms, etc.. Economic growth and welfare are negatively affected in an economy in which knowledge is financed in this way. Wages fall short of the labor marginal product. At the same time, also the compensation received by research is lower than its marginal product, thus implying insufficient incentives for knowledge accumulation and, in turn, slower growth. Moreover, costs borne to secure the exclusion of those not holding a license from accessing knowledge, which is a public good, imply that resources are wasted. The amount of resources devoted to exclusion clearly also contributes to slowing growth under elastic labor supply. If one considers the burgeoning number of new patents granted every year, the role that they have in productive activities and the frequent litigations for infringements, 12 the size of the ensuing inefficiency due to the effort for excluding those who do not pay is likely to be large.
A notable implication of the model is the compression of the labor income share, at the benefit of the income share accruing to the patent holders. The decline of the income share of labor at the advantage of the share going to intangibles and particularly to holders of patents that occurred in many countries since the 1980s, is a stylized fact that has attracted much attention (Corrado et al., 2009 ; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Koh et al., 2015) and whose motivations are widely debated. The model presented in this paper provides a possible rationale, based on the shift that occurred in the last decades from an economy in which technological progress was mainly embedded in physical capital to an economy characterized by the diffusion of information technology and by knowledge dematerialization. Hence, nowadays on the one hand in many instances knowledge directly augments the labor productivity but, on the other hand, it also commands a larger share of the ensuing income.
As far as policies aimed at correcting the inefficiencies are concerned, a standard suggestion arising in Lab-Equipment models is to provide subsidies, financed by non-distortionary taxes, to support the demand of the capital inputs which embody new ideas. In the case here considered the relevant demand, however, is that of labor. But the benefits of subsidies to support labor demand would flow only partially to finance research, while, according to equation (8) , for the remaining part they would boost the wage. The latter effect does not contribute at all to economic growth if labor supply is inelastic. Even if it is not, a single tool cannot be tuned to pursue two objectives, i.e., bringing both the labor and the knowledge supply at the efficient level. More appropriate policy intervention may instead involve the public funding of research, in order to release the results for free and get rid of the exclusion costs. If this approach is deemed undesirable as it would endanger the market incentives for research, the government could, e.g., sponsor tournaments for eliciting inventive activity (Taylor, 1995) , or buy patents and put the results into the public domain . The sole abolition of the patent system, instead, does not seems to be a suitable remedy against monopolistic exploitation when knowledge is dematerialized, because in this case the research results are very close to a pure public good, and thus highly exposed to the danger of large free riding.
